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 ON THE REDUCTION OF GENETICS TO MOLECULAR
 BIOLOGY*
 STEVEN ORLA KIMBROUGH
 University of Wisconsin-Madison
 The applicability of Nagel's concept of theory reduction, and related
 concepts of reduction, to the reduction of genetics to molecular biology
 is examined using the lactose operon in Escherichia coli as an example.
 Geneticists have produced the complete nucleotide sequence of two of the
 genes which compose this operon. If any example of reduction in genetics
 should fit Nagel's analysis, the lactose operon should. Nevertheless, Nagel's
 formal conditions of theory reduction are inapplicable in this case. Instead,
 it is argued that genetics has been partially reduced to molecular biology
 in the sense of token-token reduction.
 I
 According to one received view of science and scientific reduc-
 tion-that of the logical empiricists, including Nagel-a science must
 have a number of experimental laws. These laws must be, among
 other things, universal generalizations (see Dretske 1977 and Nagel
 1961, page 48). If the science is sufficiently advanced, it will also
 have a theory which explains the laws of the science. The question
 of whether one science, S2, is reducible to another, Si, is the question
 (under the received view) of whether the laws of S2 can be derived
 from SI augmented with correspondence rules which connect terms
 peculiar to S2 with terms of SI. Nagel writes that
 . . .when the laws of the secondary science do contain some
 term 'A' that is absent from the theoretical assumptions of the
 primary science, there are two necessary formal conditions for
 the reduction of the former to the latter: (1) Assumptions of some
 kind must be introduced which postulate suitable relations between
 whatever is signified by 'A' and traits represented by theoretical
 terms already present in the primary science. ... it will be
 convenient to refer to this condition as the "condition of connec-
 tability." (2) With the help of these additional assumptions, all
 the laws of the secondary science, including those containing the
 term 'A', must be logically derivable from the theoretical premises
 *Received September 1978; Revised December 1978.
 Philosophy of Science, 46 (1979) pp. 389-406.
 Copyright ? 1979 by the Philosophy of Science Association.
 389
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 20:34:07 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 STEVEN ORLA KIMBROUGH
 and their associated coordinating definitions in the primary disci-
 pline. Let us call this the "condition of derivability." (1961, pp.
 353-4)
 The task of this essay is to examine the formal relations between
 genetics and molecular biology in order to see if they now conform
 to Nagelian and related forms of reduction. I shall claim that they
 do not and are not likely ever to do so, in spite of attempts to argue
 the contrary (see Goosens 1978, Ruse 1976, and Schaffner 1976).
 This leads to something of a paradox, for preanalytically the science
 of genetics has been or is in the midst of being reduced to the science
 of molecular biology. After all, everyone knows that genes are made
 of DNA. I believe that another analysis of reduction properly describes
 the present relation between genetics and molecular biology and I
 shall present this analysis in Section IV.
 The argument of this essay is contained in Sections III and IV.
 The purpose of Section II is to present concisely material from genetics
 and molecular biology which will be drawn upon as subsequently
 needed. Section II contains information about the genetic and molecular
 aspects of the lactose operon, which provides a particularly good
 example for a study of the reduction of genetics, because it has
 been extensively and successfully investigated from both a genetic
 and a molecular point of view. Indeed, the two approaches have
 been very well integrated and the molecular structure of two of the
 genes in the lactose operon is known.
 II
 I propose to dispense with most of the genetic and biochemical
 background for the present discussion by the simple device of ignoring
 it. Any discussion of basic genetics and molecular biology in a short
 essay would be too brief to do much good. My arguments will be
 based upon only a few facts. Those familiar with Mendel's Laws,
 genetic mapping, the standard chromosomal abnormalities, dominance,
 what James Watson calls the Central Dogma of molecular biology
 (DNA is transcribed onto mRNA which is translated into protein.),
 the structure of DNA, and DNA replication should have little difficulty
 judging the correctness of my factual account. Those not independently
 familiar with molecular genetics will have to take it on faith that
 my factual account is correct.
 Important for what follows is that genes are on chromosomes;
 chromosomes of Escherichia coli (E. coli, a common and extensively
 studied bacterium) are naked DNA; and DNA replicates with a
 mechanism and under conditions which are fairly well understood.
 390
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 "Wild type" E. coli can live on lactose as its sole source of carbon.
 When E. coli are grown in the presence of lactose, the following
 three enzymes are present in significant quantity: beta-galactosidase,
 galactoside permease, and thiogalactoside transacetylase. When lactose
 is absent, these enzymes are either absent or present in minute
 quantities. The gene responsible for beta-galactosidase is designated
 the z gene, that for galactoside permease the y gene, and that for
 the acetylase the a gene. These genes map contiguously in the following
 order: /z/y/a/. The enzymes for which they are responsible are
 called inducible enzymes because they are present in the cell only
 when induced by a particular agent, in this case lactose and certain
 similar molecules.
 A number of mutations were discovered which allowed the produc-
 tion of three lactose enzymes (beta-galactosidase, galactoside per-
 mease, and thiogalactoside transacetylase) even in the absence of
 lactose. These mutations mapped together at some distance to the
 left of z and were called constitutive mutations. This discovery led
 to the postulation not only of a new gene, the i gene, but of a new
 kind of gene, a regulator gene. The other genes so far mentioned,
 z, y, and a, were called structural genes. The constitutive mutations
 of the i gene are labelled i- and the "wild" or non-mutant gene,
 i+. Interestingly, in E. coli merozygotes, it was found that i+ is dominant
 to i-. Other kinds of i mutants have been found but they need not
 concern us here.
 Shortly after discovery of i- mutants, mutants from another region
 affecting the activity of z, y, and a were found. These mutants were
 in what was called the operator region, o. They map adjacent to
 the z gene and cause constitutive synthesis of the lactose enzymes
 even in the presence of i+. This system-consisting of the regulator
 gene, the operator region, and the three lactose enzyme genes-is
 called the lactose operon. Although the lactose operon is an example
 of the simplest of gene regulating mechanisms, it is considerably more
 complex than described here. But what has been presented will suffice
 for our purposes.
 Put simply, the lactose operon works as follows. The i gene produces
 a substance, called the repressor, which binds to the operator and
 prevents the z, y, and a genes from producing their characteristic
 messenger RNA (mRNA) and hence their characteristic enzymes.
 When lactose is present, it somehow causes the repressor to become
 ineffective and this results in the production of the lactose enzymes
 which metabolize lactose. After lactose is completely metabolized
 (and no longer present), the repressor is again effective and production
 of the lactose enzymes ceases.
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 From the above discussion we know that there is an operator region,
 o, which maps between the i gene and the z gene in the lactose
 operon. Because so much is known about the operator region, it
 presents us with some useful examples for a study of reduction.
 According to genetic mapping experiments, the o region lies between
 and adjacent to both the z and the i genes. By use of transducing
 phages, it is possible to isolate physically the genetically characterized
 o region and to study it. One such study (Dickson, et al. 1975) led
 to the complete sequencing of the bit of DNA which functions as
 the o region for the lactose enzymes. The study also produced a
 detailed model of how the control genes work.
 A further complication must be introduced. The control region,
 o, is actually two genes-the promoter, p, and the operator, o. The
 promoter gene lies between the i gene and the o gene. The genes
 we have discussed are arranged as follows: i/p/o/z/y/a/, where
 i is a regulator gene, p and o operator genes, and z, y and a structural
 genes. Remember: all these genes were discovered, characterized,
 and mapped genetically. They are part and parcel of the science of
 genetics.
 The molecular workings of the lactose operon are, as I have said,
 complex. There are but a few facts which will suffice for the subsequent
 discussion.
 1. The p and o genes are bits of DNA whose base sequence
 has been determined.
 2. The z, y, and a genes are transcribed onto mRNA and this
 mRNA is translated into the three proteins (beta-galactosidase,
 etc.).
 3. The o gene is transcribed onto mRNA, but this mRNA is not
 translated into protein.
 4. The p gene is neither transcribed onto mRNA nor translated
 into anything at all.
 5. The i gene is transcribed and translated into protein.
 6. The p and o genes overlap, i.e., they share some nucleotide
 pairs.
 III
 In the present section I shall introduce several kinds of reduction
 and give arguments on the question of whether any of them adequately
 describes the reduction of genetics to molecular biology which is
 actually occurring. Although my subject is the question of whether
 or not the entire science of genetics can be reduced to molecular
 biology, my arguments will often center upon the question of whether
 392
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 the predicate ". .. is a gene" can be reduced to molecular biology.
 I do this for three reasons. First, genetics is a large science, containing
 too many predicates for a complete and adequate discussion in a
 short paper. Also, I do not believe that adding a discussion of more
 predicates would materially affect the conclusions to be drawn.
 Secondly, the concept of a gene is central to genetics; if it cannot
 be reduced there is reason to think that nothing very similar to the
 current science of genetics can be reduced. Thirdly, a great deal
 of work, such as that cited in Section II, has been performed which
 is certainly relevant to the reduction of the concept of a gene to
 the concepts of molecular biology.
 For convenience of exposition, I shall consider the laws of a science
 as mapping functions between the predicates of the science. An
 example of a law would be:
 Px -- Qy.
 It reads, approximately, as 'every x which is P brings about a y
 which is Q.' The predicates of the reduced science, S2, will be called
 Z, Y, X, ... and the predicates of the reducing science, Si, are
 A, B, C, ... Thus, we may picture the two sciences considered
 for the purpose of reduction as follows.
 S2: Zx Wy, Yx -- Zw, etc.
 Sl: Ax-- By, Cy-* Dx, etc.
 The question of reduction is the question of how the statements of
 one science are to be connected with the statements of another science.
 In the case that one of the sciences contains predicates not contained
 in the other science, any reduction which occurs is called a heteroge-
 neous reduction. Obviously, a reduction of genetics to molecular
 biology will be heterogeneous. The predicate ". .. is a gene" is
 part of genetics and not part of molecular biology. The same can
 be said for many other predicates, e.g. ". . . is epistatic to .. .,"
 6"... is linked with .. .." Clearly, in a heterogeneous reduction,
 if the laws or concepts of one science are to be derived from the
 laws or concepts of another science, Sl (the reducing science) must
 be augmented with statements that connect the concepts of Si with
 those of S2 (the reducing science). That is, Nagel's condition of
 connectability must be satisfied. The statements that connect concepts
 of Si and S2 are sometimes called bridge laws and sometimes called
 reduction functions. I shall employ the former term.
 Just what the nature of bridge laws is is a problem which has
 exercised philosophers considerably (see Causey 1972 and Enc 1976),
 393
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 but most of that debate can be ignored here. Whatever a bridge law
 is, it must allow for the derivation of something in the reduced science
 from something in the reducing science. If, for example, we want
 to reduce Z -- Y to A -- B, it is not enough that Z -* A and
 Y -- B. Nor is it enough that A -> Z and B -- Y. In neither case
 does Z -> Y follow from just A -- B and the bridge laws. We need
 at least Z -- A and B - Y. A biconditional relation between Z
 and A, and B and Y would also do. I shall assume that the logically
 weakest conditions are permissible for bridge laws. If it turns out
 that stronger conditions are necessary, my arguments will not be
 overthrown.
 The first kind of reduction I shall discuss is called strong type-type
 reduction' and is perhaps the kind of reduction Nagel had in mind.
 In strong type-type reduction there is a simple, one-one equivalence
 of concepts in the two sciences, such that the laws of the reduced
 science, S2, can be derived from the laws of the reducing science,
 Sl. Such a reduction would go as follows:
 Ax -> By
 Zx -. Ax
 By - Wy
 Zx - Wy.
 No one, I trust, thinks that genetics can be reduced to molecular
 biology in this way. It is simply not reasonable to think that such
 a simple, one-one correspondence obtains between the predicates of
 genetics and molecular biology. The example of the lactose operon
 (in Section II) shows at least that there is more than one kind of
 gene at the molecular level. From the view of molecular biology,
 sections of DNA which are transcribed and translated must be seen
 as of a type distinct from sections of DNA which are not both
 transcribed and translated. Yet, we have seen (in Section II) that
 some members from both types are counted as genes. I take it, then,
 that strong type-type reduction of genetics is impossible.
 The above objection to strong type-type reduction may be accomo-
 dated by what I shall call weak type-type reduction. Weak type-type
 reduction is like strong type-type reduction except that a many-one
 correspondence between the types of SI and S2 is permitted. This
 'I have borrowed the terms "type-type reduction" and "token-token" reduction
 from Fodor (1975). My analysis of what constitutes these kinds of reduction is perhaps
 more detailed than Fodor's and may differ from what he had in mind.
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 probably is the sort of reduction Nagel had in mind. A weak type-type
 reduction could go as follows:
 (Cx v Ax) -- (By v Dy)
 Zx-> (Cx v Ax)
 (Dy v By)-* Wy
 Zx-> Wy.
 Weak type-type reduction may fail for two reasons. The first of
 these is the case in which one or both of the two sciences does
 not contain laws which can serve to perform the reduction. It is
 impossible to deduce the laws of one science from the laws of another
 science if one of both of the sciences does not contain the appropriate
 laws. In the second case, weak type-type reduction may fail because
 the absence of proper bridge laws prevents reductions from occurring.
 I hold that both conditions obtain and hence that weak type-type
 reduction is not sufficient for description of the current relation
 between genetics and molecular biology. The problems with the laws
 in genetics and molecular biology will be argued immediately. Support
 for the claim that proper bridge laws are not available is deferred
 to the discussion of limited type-type reduction.
 Whatever the correct analysis of scientific laws is, general agreement
 has it that scientific laws are universal truths (see Dretske 1977).
 This feature requires two comments. First, from the fact laws must
 be universally true it follows that any statement with a ceterisparibus
 clause appended is not a law (see Moline 1975). If a law is true
 only under certain, but not completely specified, conditions, then
 it is just not universally true under the conditions specified. The
 second point about the requirement of universality is that even
 statistical laws are universal generalizations (see Nagel 1961). Very
 roughly, I take it that the general form of a statistical law is as
 follows: Px -- Qy, with a certain probability. Notice: non-statistical
 laws can be seen as special cases of statistical laws, with the probability
 of Qy equal to 1; and every x which is Px has the same probability
 of bringing about a y which is Qy. Thus it is not a problem for
 a statistical law if some x's which are Px bring about Qy and some
 do not, so long as each x which is Px has the same probability of
 so doing.
 Having made these remarks about scientific laws I am prepared
 to discuss the question of whether laws in genetics or molecular biology
 are universally true. I shall restrict my attention to Mendel's Second
 Law, an obvious candidate for a law of genetics. For reasons of
 economy other putative laws of genetics-e.g. Mendel's First Law,
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 the Hardy-Weinberg Law-will not be discussed. I believe that an
 examination of them would not alter the conclusions I shall draw.
 Mendel's Second Law, the law of independent assortment, is usually
 put in rather simple form by textbooks. The following is a decent
 approximation of the Second Law.
 If x, y, and z are genes in a living, diploid organism which produces
 gametes and if x and y are an allelic pair and if x A y # z,
 then in the gametes produced only two combinations of these
 genes are possible, x and z, or y and z, and these two combinations
 will be present in equal proportions.
 As stated, this law is not universally true, even as a statistical
 generalization. Genes close together on a single chromosome will
 not assort randomly during meiosis and are said to be linked. Thus
 the above formulation of Mendel's Second Law is not universally
 true, for it it were every gene would have an identical probability
 of assorting with every other gene not its allele. This is clearly false,
 as the cases of gene linkage show.
 Perhaps Mendel's Second Law can be modified and reformulated
 in light of current understanding. A tempting way to do this would
 be to add "neither x nor y is linked with z" to the antecedent of
 the Law. The difficulty with this is that the result of this operation
 is a tautology rather than a scientific Law, unless "x andy are linked"
 can be unpacked in some way other than merely saying that genes
 which do not obey the Second Law are linked. There is a way to
 surmount this difficulty, but it has problems of its own. Linkage
 may be characterized as follows: x and z are linked if and only if
 x and z are on the same chromosome. The effect of this modification
 would be to restrict Mendel's Second Law to genes which are on
 different chromosomes. Our problems are not over, however. First,
 it may be doubted that 'chromosome' is a concept of genetics.
 Chromosomes may be identified through biochemical and cytological
 techniques, but not through breeding experiments alone, i.e. not
 through genetic techniques alone. There are two ways to go. Either
 the move to save the Second Law can be seen as begging the question
 of the reduction or it can be allowed that genetics and molecular
 biology share some concepts. Even granting that genetics and molecular
 biology share some predicates, difficulties persist.
 In an important sense, counting 'chromosome' as a concept of
 both genetics and molecular biology does beg questions about reduc-
 tion. Genetics in its pure, unreduced, and Mendelian form is the
 science devoted to the study of the effect of various sorts of breedings
 on the dispersal of phenotypic characters. From a purely genetic
 396
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 point of view it matters not whether vitalism is true or false, whether
 genes are on chromosomes, whether life is carbon based or silicon
 based, or whether living things share any constituents with non-living
 things. A difficulty with genetics, as we have seen, is that one of
 its most basic generalizations cannot be law-like unless concepts from
 another science are imported. In our example, the concept is that
 of a chromosome and the other science is molecular biology. This
 is to say that the concept, 'chromosome', has been imported into
 genetics and has been connected with certain other terms in genetics.
 And this is to admit that some kind of reduction has occurred. Thus,
 while there is no reduction unless Mendel's Second Law is made
 law-like, this cannot be achieved unless the Second Law incorporates
 a term from the science doing the reducing. The question of reduction
 is begged by counting 'chromosome' as a concept of both genetics
 and molecular biology, unless we account for the introduction of
 'chromosome' into genetics. Bridges (1916) indicates that 'chromo-
 some' was not imported into genetics by a reduction of the kind
 we are considering (weak type-type reduction), but to argue this would
 take us too far afield.
 The reductionist is not home free even if the argument of the previous
 paragraph is rejected and it is agreed that genetics and molecular
 biology unproblematically share the concept of the chromosome, for
 the modified Second Law remains not universally true. There are
 other causes of exception to the Second Law, for example meiotic
 drive and segregation distortion. We might try to accomodate these
 in the way we accomodated linkage. Meiotic drive is any process
 which results in alleles being represented in unequal proportions in
 the gametes. Adding this, however, to the Second Law creates a
 tautology. Meiotic drive must be unpacked, just as linkage had to
 be. There are two problems. First, any unpacking of 'meiotic drive'
 will inevitably be done in molecular terms. These terms will be less
 plausibly part of genetics than 'chromosome'. Second, how the
 unpacking is to be done is not known. But if it is unknown, we
 cannot do the reduction and this violates the assumption that reduction
 is occurring.2
 The claim that Mendel's laws, and indeed most of the generalizations
 in biology, are not universally true is hardly original (see Fodor 1975,
 Goosens 1978, and Smart 1963). There are, nevertheless, several
 responses which might be made by someone defending weak type-type
 2There is little reason to think that qualifying the Second Law to accomodate linkage,
 meiotic drive, and segregation distortion would give us a universal truth. Even with
 these qualifications, it does not seem we would have a law.
 397
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 reduction. First, this sort of reductionist might claim that there are
 law-like generalizations in genetics other than the Second Law and
 that these generalizations can be reduced to molecular biology. In
 reply I say that the issue is not whether there are some universal
 truths in genetics which might be reduced to molecular biology, but
 whether the important and central generalizations in genetics are
 universal truths amenable to reduction. No one, so far as I know
 (including Schaffner in his 1976) can point to a list of the main and
 the universally true generalizations in genetics. Let alone producing
 one, the proponents of type-type reduction (of whatever sort) have
 yet to provide a roster of the generalizations in genetics which both
 are central and are prime candidates for eventual reduction.
 A second kind of response to be made by a reductionist is to
 argue that genetics cannot now be reduced but that with further progress
 we can expect real laws to be discovered and these will be reduced.
 In addition, the reductionist could claim that surely these real laws
 will closely resemble significant generalizations currently in the body
 of genetics. Granting that progress in genetics will continue and that
 the generalizations of the future will resemble those of today, the
 second response remains inadequate. It forces us to abandon our
 intuition that reduction is and has been occurring. Giving the second
 response is to admit that reduction has not occurred, but that prospects
 seem good. This, of course, does not illuminate the present relation
 between genetics and molecular biology and does violate the assump-
 tion that reduction has been underway. Another problem with the
 second response is that it is not at all clear that the generalizations
 of genetics can be extended and made more precise without actually
 merging genetics and molecular biology. We would, I suppose, want
 to call such a merger a reduction, but it is not the sort of reduction
 we have been considering. From the above discussion of Mendel's
 Second Law, I would argue that the presence of meiotic drive and
 segregation distortion prevents the Second Law from being universally
 true. I would argue further that it is unlikely meiotic drive and
 segregation distortion can be sufficiently analysed so as to make the
 Second Law universally true without, in the meantime, importing
 so much of molecular biology into genetics that the two sciences will
 succumb to marriage. In Section IV, I propose an account of reduction
 which can easily accomodate this confluence of genetics and molecular
 biology.
 One who believed in weak type-type reduction of genetics to
 molecular biology has a third response to my claim that central
 generalizations of genetics are not universal truths and hence not
 laws. The reductionist could claim that I have set my standards too
 398
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 high for law-likeness and that we must simply accept the fact that
 laws in biology, as well as in other sciences, have exceptions.3 My
 reply to this response is to ask about the laws of the reducing science,
 in our case molecular genetics. Either the laws of molecular genetics
 have exceptions or they do not. In the latter case, I fail to see how
 the criterion of deducibility can be satisfied. In the former case,
 if the laws of molecular biology have exceptions it would be extremely
 unlikely that the laws of the two sciences had exceptions in exactly
 the same situations (see Fodor 1975 for a similar argument), and
 barring this possibility the condition of deducibility cannot be satisfied.
 So much for laws in genetics. What are the laws of molecular
 biology? Certain generalizations in molecular biology are plausibly
 law-like, e.g. generalizations about melting points of various biologi-
 cally important compounds. But these are not the laws we need to
 derive the generalizations of genetics. No one, so far as I know,
 has produced credible analogues to Mendel's laws or the Hardy-Wein-
 berg law. Also, there is considerable slack in the generalizations of
 molecular biology. In double stranded DNA purines usually oppose
 pyrimidines, but not always. Under cellular conditions a double
 stranded DNA will make a complete rotation every 34 angstroms,
 except where it is twisted; every human cell contains about six feet
 of DNA. In sum, molecular biology does not contain the laws which
 would allow it to reduce genetics in a weak type-type fashion.
 If even weak type-type reduction is impossible given the current
 status of genetics and molecular biology, what is the relation between
 them? A still weaker sort of reduction, which I shall call limited
 type-type reduction, might be possible. This seems to be the kind
 3I am sympathetic to this view of laws. The following comment (with emphasis
 added by me) is, I believe, typical of biologists when they talk about laws.
 Twenty years have passed since Sandler and Novitski . . . summarized the
 handful of cases of meiotic drive that were then known and predicted that more
 examples would be found, in a wider variety of species, as the genetic study
 of higher organisms became more precise and extensive. It therefore seems
 appropriate at this symposium to inquire whether their prediction has been validated.
 The answer is yes, and the answer is no; yes because the number of known
 examples of meiotic drive has increased from a handful to more than twenty
 and because the number of species exhibiting the phenomenon has increased;
 no because meiotic drive is apparently an unusual phenomenon. Mendel's law
 of segregation is still safe. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of examples
 of meiotic drive has been impressive, so much so that we can now begin to
 consider how-or if-the phenomenon can be put to some practical use. (Hartl
 1977, p. 64)
 The difficulty, for the present, with accepting a theory of laws which allows that
 they can have exceptions is that this move does not seem promising for supporting
 any kind of type-type reduction. See my argument below.
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 of reduction that Hull, Ruse, and Schaffner have been debating. All
 that is required of limited type-type reduction is that the types of
 the reduced science be derived from the types of the reducing science.
 Thus, limited type-type reduction is compatible with there being no
 laws in either genetics or molecular biology. Note that if limited
 type-type reduction fails, then so must strong and weak type-type
 reduction. The question of limited type-type reduction is nearly
 coterminus with the question of whether adequate bridge laws are
 possible.
 David Hull has argued (1974 and 1976) against what I have called
 weak type-type reduction of genetics to molecular biology. His
 argument, however, applies to what I have called limited type-type
 reduction and can be reconstructed so that it deals explicitly with
 this kind of reduction. The argument is approximately as follows.
 Let S2 be under consideration for reduction to Sl.
 1. Deduction of a science, S2', strongly analogous to S2 from
 Sl is necessary for limited type-type reduction.
 2. One-many and many-many relations exist between many terms
 and predicates of molecular biology and genetics; hence deduc-
 tion is impossible given the current terms of genetics.
 3. Therefore, limited type-type reduction is impossible given
 current meanings of the terms and predicates of genetics and
 molecular biology.
 4. Furthermore, any science which is deducible from molecular
 biology will not be strongly analogous to genetics as we know
 it.
 5. Therefore, genetics cannot be reduced to molecular biology,
 in any limited type-type sense of reduction.
 For further discussion of points (4) and (5) above, see Hull (1974
 and 1976), Ruse (1976), and Schaffner (1976). I shall not directly
 discuss them further.
 The reason why one-many and many-many relations between the
 terms and predicates of molecular biology and genetics will not do
 is that we want to deduce statements of genetics from molecular
 biology. If one-many or many-many relations exist, we shall at best
 be able to deduce statements such as "P is a gene or P is a K"
 where K is something other than a gene. This sort of statement is
 not part of the science of genetics.
 I want to corroborate Hull's argument with one of my own. Partly
 because of restrictions on space, I shall not argue that every type
 in genetics (or even the central ones) cannot be reduced in a limited
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 type-type sense. My argument shall be restricted to the concept of
 the gene, surely a central one in genetics. For discussion of other
 types in genetics see Hull (1974 and 1976), Ruse (1976), and Schaffner
 (1976). The argument is as follows.
 1. 'Gene' is a type in genetics.
 2. For limited type-type reduction of a type in genetics to molecular
 biology to occur there must not be one-many or many-many
 relations between the types in molecular biology and the types
 in genetics.
 3. A many-many relation exists between the types in molecular
 biology and 'gene', a type in genetics.
 4. Therefore, 'gene' cannot be reduced to molecular biology in
 a limited type-type fashion.
 The first premise is obviously true; Mendel's laws are about a certain
 kind of thing, genes. I have already argued for the second premise.
 What remains, then, is to demonstrate the truth of the third premise,
 since the argument is valid.
 To be shown is that there are some individuals in the set of genes
 which belong to no type in molecular biology all of whose members
 are genes. This can be done conclusively only for the current states
 of genetics and molecular biology. Of course, genetics may be altered
 in future, but I take it that some sort of reduction has been occurring
 and our problem is to explicate what that is. I shall argue for (3)
 by examining some types in molecular biology and showing that they
 will not work for limited type-type reduction of the concept of the
 gene.
 a.) We cannot infer from the fact that something is DNA in a
 living organism to the claim that it is a gene or part of a gene. Although
 all the E. coli genes known so far are composed of DNA, not all
 the DNA is part of some gene, even if only chromosomal DNA is
 counted. Especially in eucaryotes there is every reason to think that
 not every bit of chromosomal DNA is part of some gene. It seems
 that some chromosomal DNA plays a purely structural role in eucaryo-
 tic chromosomes.
 Still, we know that genes are composed of DNA. Are there any
 types of DNA which disjunctively are co-extensional with the set
 of genes? I do not believe so, given the current state of molecular
 biology. Here the discussion of the genes of the lactose operon is
 helpful. Consider several candidates.
 b.) That every gene is identical with some length of DNA which
 is transcribed onto mRNA and translated into a polypeptide is initially
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 plausible. True enough, the i, z, a, and y genes of the lactose operon
 are transcribed and translated (under standard conditions), and it may
 be safe to say that all sections of DNA which are transcribed and
 translated are genes or parts of genes. Still, reduction is not served,
 and for two reasons. First, not all genes are transcribed and translated.
 As we have seen, such is the case with the p and o genes of the
 lactose operon. Second, even if all genes were sections of DNA which
 under standard conditions were transcribed and translated, more would
 be needed to specify a limited type-type reduction, for the only
 conclusion to follow from this is that every length of DNA transcribed
 and translated was a gene or was part of a gene. Manifestly, 'gene'
 and 'part of a gene' are distinct concepts. Again, we are left with
 a many-many relation between molecular biology and genetics.
 c.) As a third effort, it might seem promising to include as genes
 all segments of DNA which are merely transcribed onto mRNA. Such
 a move would permit us to account for the o gene of the lactose
 operon but not for thep gene. Also, the second objection to suggestion
 (b) obtains in the present case.
 d.) A fourth suggestion, designed to accomodate the p gene of
 the lactose operon, is more difficult to come by. The p gene is not
 transcribed onto RNA, but this category-not transcribed onto
 RNA-can hardly do for the purposes of reduction. There are many
 segments of DNA which are not transcribed and which are neither
 genes nor parts of genes. Perhaps we ought to narrow the category
 to include only those lengths of DNA which as a whole are not
 transcribed but which play a role in regulating transcription of other
 segments of DNA. This will not do either. There is no reason to
 believe that such a category includes only genes and not segments
 of DNA which are not genes. And we still have the problem of
 distinguishing between a whole gene and a part of a gene.
 e.) I can think of only one other plausible suggestion for finding
 types in molecular biology including all and only the genes of genetics.
 Perhaps certain kinds of nucleotide sequences will suffice for the
 purposes of reduction. Perhaps, for example, all and only genes are
 segments of DNA which end in certain ways. This is tempting because
 it is known that certain triplets of nucleotides (UAA, UAG, and UGA)
 are read as punctuation marks in protein synthesis. Even so, the
 suggestion will not do because not all genes have ends which are
 defined by one of these three stop codons. The p gene is not
 transcribed and as expected does not end with a stop codon.
 Interestingly, it overlaps the o gene, which might be taken to suggest
 that the p and o genes ought not be distinguished at the molecular
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 level. Here is a further problem for reduction, one on which I shall
 not dwell.
 The suggestion that certain kinds of DNA nucleotide sequences
 correspond to genes has been undermined considerably by recent
 developments in eucaryotic molecular genetics (see Darnell 1978 for
 a review). It now appears that in eucaryotic systems DNA is often
 transcribed onto mRNA which is then spliced and reassembled before
 it is translated into protein. The lesson being drawn from this is
 that, in eucaryotes at least, a single gene does not need to be a
 continuous section of DNA. Given this, what determines where a
 gene begins and ends on the DNA are the structures of the enzymes
 which mediate the splicing and reconstruction of the mRNA, and
 not any inherent kind of structure in the gene itself.
 There is another reason why the present suggestion will not suffice
 for limited type-type reduction. Even if suggestion (e) should prove
 correct, it has not so far and this counters the pre-analytic assumption
 that reduction is occurring between genetics and molecular biology.
 The conclusion that limited type-type reduction of the most central
 concept in genetics to molecular biology has not taken place, even
 in part, is forced upon us.
 IV
 We now have something of a dilemma. On one hand it seems that
 reduction must be impossible for genetics and molecular biology, and
 on the other hand we have our pre-analytic belief that reduction is
 underway. After all, we know that genes are made of DNA and
 we even know the precise molecular structure of two genes, the p
 and o genes of the lactose operon. If this is not reduction, what
 is?
 Our problem can be solved by distinguishing yet another kind of
 reduction. Following Fodor (see 1975) again, I shall call this kind
 of reduction token-token reduction. When token-token reduction
 occurs, individuals described in the language of one science are
 identified with individuals described in the language of another science.
 This is a weak sort of reduction; it is implied by but does not imply
 every kind of reduction I have discussed. The following may count
 as reduction functions or bridge laws:
 1. (for some x, y)(Zx Ay x = y)
 2. M = (some x such that Ax)
 3. N = (some x such that Zx)
 4. N= M
 403
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 20:34:07 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 STEVEN ORLA KIMBROUGH
 where M is an individual constant of S2; N an individual constant
 of S1; A a predicate of Si; and Z a predicate of S2.
 Some statements with one of these forms are trivial or uninteresting.
 Looking at (1), no one recently has doubted that some gene is identical
 with some molecular entity. On the other hand, the discovery that
 some gene is identical with some length of DNA was momentous
 and has the form of (1). I suggest that interesting reduction functions
 be distinguished from uninteresting statements of the same form on
 informal grounds. What these grounds are is a difficult but not, I
 believe, insurmountable problem. And it is a problem for another
 paper.
 If the range of the variables and M and N in (1)-(4) may include
 properties, then (1)-(4) will suffice for property reduction. For example,
 the property of having the trait of sickle cell anemia is (in some
 individuals) identical with the property of having a certain kind of
 defective hemoglobin.
 An interesting feature of token-token reduction is that the formal
 condition for it does not distinguish between the reducing science
 and the reduced science. Identity is a symmetrical relation. There
 is, however, no reason why the reduced and the reducing sciences
 cannot be informally distinguished. A plausible way in which this
 might be done is to stipulate that all the individuals of the reduced
 science can be identified with individuals of the reducing science,
 but not vice versa.
 What is obvious is that token-token reduction of genetics to molecular
 biology is partially completed. Returning to the example of the lactose
 operon, it has been discovered that at least some individual p genes
 of E. coli lactose operons are one and the same as a certain sequence
 of nucleotide pairs in double stranded DNA. A similar story can
 be told of the o gene. Long ago it was discovered that some genes
 are identical with some lengths of DNA. I have already mentioned
 the case of sickle cell anemia. Other examples are legion.
 It might be asked what good a partial token-token reduction does
 to the cause of science. The answer is that it is difficult to imagine
 how we might obtain an understanding of the mechanisms underlying
 events described in S2 without some token-token reduction of S2
 to Si (See Enc 1976, pp. 305-6; Fodor 1975, pp. 9-26). A first step
 in understanding the mechanisms of how genes work is to discover
 that some genes are made of DNA, and to do so is to effect a partial
 token-token reduction of genetics to molecular biology. In the case
 of the lactose operon, very little can be understood of how the i,
 p, and o genes function until some token-token reduction is achieved.
 Explanation of why i+ is dominant to i- (in merozygotes) is not
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 possible purely within genetics. Dickson (1975) confirms these points.
 A mechanism is proposed in that paper for how the p and o genes
 function. The fact that some p and o genes were discovered to have
 certain base sequences is important evidence for the model.
 There are at least two problems with token-token reduction. First
 is the difficulty of individuating concepts in SI and S2, and in comparing
 them. There is no guarantee they will be commensurable. My reply
 is that certainly this is a legitimate worry, calling for additional
 philosophical analysis. However that may be, in the case of genetics
 and molecular biology, this problem has in fact been solved well
 enough that we can with great confidence say that genes are on
 chromosomes, that genes are made of DNA, that the p gene of the
 lactose operon has a certain DNA base sequence, and so on.
 A second difficulty with token-token reduction is that it may not
 appear to capture the generality of the reduction which seems preana-
 lytically to be taking place. We know not only that some genes are
 on chromosomes but that almost all of them are. I would point out
 that reduction functions, such as those above, which use existential
 quantifiers can achieve a great deal of generality by being applied
 to many distinct individuals. For example, in humans most (but not
 all) males have exactly two sex chromosomes, X and Y. This fact
 can be represented in the form of (1), above, where Z is the property
 of being a human male and A is the property of having one X and
 one Y chromosome. Generality is achieved by pointing out that in
 fact very many distinct individuals share these two properties. If
 the arguments presented above on type-type reduction are correct,
 nothing stronger can be achieved in the connection between genetics
 and molecular biology, at least for some of the main concepts in
 the two sciences.
 If the argument of this section is correct, understanding the mecha-
 nisms of events in S2 is facilitated by token-token reduction of S2
 to Sl. But token-token reduction is possible without type-type reduc-
 tion. Indeed, a complete token-token reduction of S2 to SI is possible
 without any type-type reduction. Such a reduction would greatly
 illuminate S2. One wonders what more ought be expected of reduction.
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